

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

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10 September 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

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paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to Articles I and II
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Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and
security:

- A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States
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Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working
languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in
a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this
document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des
Nations, Geneva.

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

- (1) ARTICLES IV AND III (3), PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II
- (2) ARTICLE V

ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (agenda item 14):

- A. ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY BY STATES
- B. MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING A WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN welcomed members and said that the Committee's terms of reference had been worked out by the Preparatory Committee and adopted by the Conference. The primary task was to review the implementation of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of use of nuclear energy and included article IV and article III (3) and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, as well as to articles I, II and V. The Committee shared with Main Committee II the review of agenda item 14 and there might be some overlap because of the links between international co-operation and the non-proliferation assurances through safeguards. Close contact would be maintained with Main Committee II in order to avoid any duplication of work.

The documents before the Committee included one on basic facts within the framework of United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of articles IV and V (NPT/CONF.IV/4), the statement by the Non-Aligned and Other States (NPT/CONF.IV/30), and two background papers by the IAEA (NPT/CONF.IV/13 and 14). Parts of the papers provided by the depositaries were also relevant (NPT/CONF.IV/19, 20 and 21), as well as parts of the memorandum from the five Nordic countries (NPT/CONF.IV/18).

He suggested that the Committee should limit the debate to two meetings and devote the remainder of the available time to the drafting exercise, while allowing delegations to make statements at a later stage.

Mr. WAGNER (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said that his country had acceded to the NPT from the very beginning and had a long tradition in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a non-nuclear-weapon Party. The practical results of the implementation of the NPT had proved its validity and justified extending it beyond the year 1995.

At present, his country operated eight 440 MW light water reactor units supplying about 28 per cent of total electricity production. Four additional 440 MW and two 1,000 MW units were under construction. All the reactors were of USSR design. Recent political and economic developments had resulted in a change from a unilateral USSR orientation to broader co-operation with advanced partners all over the world and, in that new orientation, strong emphasis was being laid on increasing operational safety. His delegation welcomed the fact that the NPT did not impose limitations on efforts to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy in international co-operation.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's activities in relation to article IV was concerned more particularly with developing and increasing the level of nuclear safety and radiological protection. Hence it wholeheartedly supported the efforts of the IAEA and recommended greater activity and universal adherence to improved and internationally recognized standards for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including all aspects of management and disposal of radioactive wastes. Examples of active co-operation in that field included the invitation to the IAEA's OSART mission to the Dukovany nuclear power plant (NPP) in 1989, the invitation to the IAEA's ASSET mission to the Jaskovské Bohumice V-1 NPP and the invitation to the IAEA's pre-OSART missions to the Telemelin NPP site in 1990.

His country's accession in 1987 to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident had also helped to strengthen nuclear safety and radiological protection. It had concluded bilateral agreements in the matter with Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary, and had been a member of the IAEA's IRS system since 1985. It had also played an active role in the Council of Regulatory Bodies established among WWER-type reactor-operating countries.

His delegation supported the efforts of IAEA to ensure long-term forecasts of nuclear material and equipment supplies with effective assurances of non-proliferation. The area was one in which a successful solution had yet

to be arrived at. The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had prepared a number of basic documents presenting some recommendations. The main task of the CAS, namely the formulation of principles for the assurance of supplies, had not yet been completely fulfilled. He therefore recommended that CAS should resume its activity and seek for new solutions.

The technical assistance and co-operation programmes organized within the framework of the IAEA and referred to in article IV were important. By the agreement on technical assistance concluded with the IAEA, his Government had undertaken to utilize the accepted assistance exclusively for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Actually, his country not only accepted but also offered technical assistance and Czechoslovak experts were sent to developing countries to organize education and training; specialized IAEA education and training courses were also held in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic itself. His country's total contribution since the Third Review Conference to the IAEA technical assistance budget amounted approximately to 17 million crowns.

Other examples of active international co-operation could be cited, such as the Arrangement between the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission (CSAEC) and the United States for the exchange of technical information and co-operation in nuclear safety matters, concluded in 1989. A similar agreement had been reached that same year with France on the exchange of technical information related to nuclear safety inspection activities and co-operation in the elaboration of a set of principles on nuclear safety. Co-operation with Japan in the same field went back to 1986.

Two other agreements were in preparation, one with the Government of the United States and another with the Government of Canada on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Co-operation in the same field with the USSR and the CMEA member countries was still good.

All those examples showed that the NPT provided a firm world-wide basis for useful co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any discrimination or limitation on development in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that it afforded assurances of compliance with the non-proliferation undertakings referred to in articles I and II. For that reason, his delegation supported all efforts to keep the Treaty in force without any revision and to achieve universal accession to it.

Mr. ANGUIANO (Mexico) said that the Committee was called upon to evaluate the events which have occurred since the Third Review Conference with respect to articles IV and V and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs of the NPT, and to put forward fair, objective and realistic conclusions and recommendations. The Committee should not confine its work to bringing up to date the wording of the 26 paragraphs on international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which had been included in the 1985 Final Declaration. In its discussion on the extent of progress or regression with respect to such co-operation, the Committee could rely on the experience of the parties to the NPT. It would also find useful guidance in such documents as the valuable IAEA papers (NPT/CONF.IV/13 and 14) and the most recent papers of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

There was an obvious concern on the part of a considerable number of States Parties about the genuine application and fulfilment of the provisions of the NPT on nuclear co-operation for peaceful purposes. There was dissatisfaction at the restrictions that still existed with regard to the exchange of equipment, materials and knowledge of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes among the Parties. There was also dissatisfaction at the limited access of developing countries to that area.

At the same time, some of the limitations and restrictions observed in 1985 had decreased in recent years as a result of a number of factors which had altered the pattern of the world market for nuclear resources for peaceful purposes. The concern with the security and the reliability of nuclear reactors had greatly increased following the Chernobyl accident and in some developed countries there was a slow down - or even scrapping - of some programmes for the production of electricity with nuclear energy. The high cost of projects of that kind and the absence of international financing had deterred many developing countries from expanding their nuclear energy programmes.

It followed that there was now an excess supply of nuclear-source electric energy in the international market. World demand for new reactors was practically at a standstill and only 96 units had been under construction at the end of 1989. Between 1985 and 1989 the design capacity of nuclear power stations had grown only by 20 per cent and, at the outset of the present decade, nuclear energy accounted for less than 17 per cent of world

electricity production when some 10 years before it had been forecast that at least one-fifth of total electricity would be of nuclear origin. Accordingly, the countries that were the traditional suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and the new suppliers which had emerged, had a large part of their production and export capacity lying idle. Most of them were competing for maintenance contracts and the sale of spare parts for stations already in operation. As a result, transfers of nuclear technology and materials for the few remaining users in the market had become more flexible. That development did not reflect any real change of attitude and was simply due to the market situation.

To state the position more precisely, the analyses made by the IAEA (NPT/CONF.IV/13, annexes II.A and II.B) showed that the international market was clearly a "buyer's market" with ample possibilities for diversification in supplies. Although no major changes had been recorded in the export policies of the suppliers, including restrictions on the export of "sensitive technologies" and constraints with discriminatory elements, a distinct flexibility was apparent in the application of constraints, especially with regard to the so-called "prior consent rights".

He had in mind the supply of nuclear plants and equipment, uranium, initial and back-end fuel cycle services, complete fuel supply and technological and operational support. In all those spheres of the peaceful nuclear industry, there had been fewer cases of restriction and since 1980 there had been no cases of interruption of supplies to buyer countries bound by safeguard agreements. Those developments had been the result of adverse economic conditions in many countries which had been obliged to reduce their productive capacity in the past decade. Suppliers had thus been able to leave part of their productive capacity idle. Another factor was the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear plants, equipment and materials.

It was in that area that the contradictions between non-proliferation and nuclear development for peaceful purposes became evident. In view of the dynamics of nuclear research and nuclear industries in threshold countries which were not States Parties to the Treaty but had mostly established safeguards agreements with the IAEA, there were countries which felt restricted and discriminated against in regard to access to equipment, materials and technology which might obviously serve a dual purpose - for peaceful or warlike purposes. Consequently, in discussions in such forums as

the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, three threshold developing countries had assumed a leadership role in discussing with the industrialized countries their over-emphasis on a close tie between non-proliferation commitments and the right to unrestricted access to technologies. Mexico, as a State Party both to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was on a number of occasions the object of discrimination because it was subjected to restrictions on access to advanced nuclear technology, yet observed that, as a result of economic interests, private enterprises of developed countries whose Governments had declared that they were against the proliferation of sensitive technology none the less enabled strategic supplies to reach countries which were not subject to international safeguards of any type. Such contradictions and inequitable treatment would come to an end only when the NPT moved towards a total ban on nuclear-weapon testing and towards general disarmament.

Various developments indicated that there had been significant changes in the world energy market. Among them was the need of several developing countries to step up their electrification programmes based on fossil fuels, which would certainly affect the world environment through the increase in carbon dioxide and other similar gases and would have repercussions on the public concept of the risks and advantages of using nuclear energy to obtain electricity. The emergence of new technologies to reduce the costs of nuclear energy would also bring about changes in energy policies. Again, progress in the application of nuclear resources for purposes other than electricity and in international co-operation on nuclear security and radiological protection was helping to renew world interest and demand for nuclear technology and equipment for multiple peaceful uses.

In short, the Committee must bear in mind that, in the light of current circumstances, restrictive and discriminatory policies on the part of suppliers would tend to be revived in regard to the provision of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For that reason, efforts such as those undertaken by the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which had assumed less importance as a result of the availability of uranium and other material, should be resumed.

After having surmounted many problems, Mexico was, with the commencement of commercial operations at its nuclear power station at Laguna Verde, becoming a member of the group of States which were producing energy from nuclear sources. As a country committed to non-proliferation and in particular to the NPT, it had confirmed its decision to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and under IAEA safeguards.

For developing countries such as Mexico, there was an urgent need for the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology without discrimination to be intensified in order to support national economic and social development efforts. The NPT, which offered an ideal framework in which to achieve that objective, had not been entirely able to fulfil its mission as a result of the lack of political will on the part of some suppliers to commit themselves to broad international co-operation programmes. Lack of external financing severely restricted the opportunities for many developing countries to continue with their nuclear energy projects.

The present Conference was the immediate predecessor of the 1995 Conference, at which a decision would have to be taken on the future of the Treaty. It was therefore all the more urgent for States Parties to fulfil their obligations. Total nuclear disarmament was the best means of ensuring non-proliferation and of guaranteeing that nuclear energy would be used solely for peaceful purposes. Fulfilment of the commitments emerging from the present Conference would provide a basis for strengthening the Treaty and effectively extending it into the coming century.

Mrs. EL TALLAWI (Egypt) said that her country attached considerable importance to the objective and purpose of article IV of the NPT; the peaceful use of nuclear technology was one of the main pillars of the Treaty and she therefore hoped that the final document would include practical and comprehensive recommendations on that aspect.

Referring to several matters already raised by her delegation at the previous Review Conference, she drew attention to the desirability of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of according preferential treatment to States Parties in facilitating the exchange of information, the technical capacity and the financial ability to develop peaceful nuclear programmes. Another aspect to be borne in mind was that the financial resources currently available to the IAEA in general and to its promotion and technical co-operation activities in particular were not

commensurate with its obligations arising out of the terms of the NPT. Such resources should therefore be significantly increased and, in that respect, her delegation's proposal in 1985 to set up a fund for that purpose should be reconsidered in the light of the current situation, in which nuclear technology had become essential in order to resolve many developmental problems and had proved its usefulness in agriculture, medicine, water desalination and measures to combat desertification. Indeed, the state of development of the developing countries meant that such advanced technology was essential in overcoming the crucial developmental problems that could not be solved by traditional means.

Another aspect raised in 1985 had been that of financing the nuclear power programmes of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. The matter should be pursued further and the Conference should find ways and means to overcome financing difficulties. At the same time, transparency with regard to the use of the results of scientific meetings of the IAEA should be promoted in order to make it possible for all concerned to use the latest developments in the field of nuclear technology, to collect information and set it out in a clear fashion so that decision-makers would become increasingly aware of the latest advances.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty having embarked upon peaceful nuclear programmes should have assurances that their programmes would not be endangered. Assurances should cover the danger of attack or threat of attack on safeguarded nuclear facilities; States Parties should, on request, provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties subjected to such an attack and States Parties should refrain from providing any sort of nuclear co-operation or assistance to any State which made an attack of that kind.

The IAEA had been successful in tackling the issue of the dumping of nuclear waste by means of guidelines which had been agreed by consensus and it was to be hoped that further progress would be made in that area. As to the CAS, her country had strongly supported its work and believed that it should not be terminated, even if there had been a change in the market, as it was still important to monitor the situation. She joined the representative of Mexico and other speakers who had spoken in favour of reactivating the work of that Committee. Lastly, on full-scope safeguards her delegation fully supported the proposal submitted by Australia.

Mr. WISBER LOEIS (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States, introduced the draft resolution, contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in relation with the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The draft resolution contained elements which reflected the position of the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in accordance with their priorities, needs and interests in international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In presenting the draft resolution the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties were sincerely committed to pursuing the objectives of the Treaty as stipulated in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs. Recognition of all elements contained in the draft resolution would provide a strong impetus for effective implementation of the Treaty by, inter alia: eliminating the discriminatory practices exerted by some States Parties in providing assistance in the nuclear field to developing countries which were States Parties; terminating the supply of sensitive nuclear technology in contradiction with the spirit of article IV in relation to article I of the Treaty; further striving for the establishment of principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and reaffirming the role and activities of the IAEA in its promotional as well as regulatory endeavours.

In that respect, he drew attention to the terms of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. The draft resolution brought into sharp focus matters for consideration during the present Conference. Adopting it would reaffirm the validity of article IV and thus strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the most widely acceptable non-proliferation régime.

Mr. ENDO (Japan) said that, in order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and maintain and enhance its universality, it was essential to make adherence to it even more attractive by adopting specific measures. Two important areas should be considered in that respect: further promotion of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses, and reinforcement of export controls for nuclear-related materials.

In regard to the first area, the fact that there were over 140 States Parties to the Treaty indicated that it was one of the most widely accepted agreements. States had adhered to the Treaty in such large numbers not only because they were convinced that the NPT régime was indispensable in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also because the régime was

functioning well as a basic framework for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan was keenly conscious of that fact and, as one of the most advanced countries in that area, was determined to continue to extend co-operation within that framework, as it had done over the previous five years.

International co-operation with the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy took a variety of forms. Japan, for its part, placed emphasis on multilateral Government-to-Government co-operation through the IAEA as well as on bilateral co-operation, and had greatly increased its financial contributions. Japan's contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in the fiscal year 1990 amounted to over \$5 million, or a little over 11 per cent of the Fund as a whole. That figure represented an increase by almost 200 per cent over the 1985 contribution. Resources allocated for technical assistance by the IAEA were, of course, modest, but compared with the IAEA budget's zero growth in other areas the increase was a substantial one.

Utilizing its advance nuclear technology, Japan had played a central role in financial and technological assistance to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the implementation of co-operation programmes of the Regional Co-operative Agreement, a form of co-operation which it greatly appreciated. Japan welcomed the recent establishment of a similar agreement for Africa and would demonstrate its great interest in the new scheme by attending the inaugural meeting to take place in Cairo on 4 September 1990. Japan would continue to contribute as much as possible towards the expansion and strengthening of multilateral co-operation through the IAEA.

As to the issue of preferential treatment raised by some participants in the Conference, his country shared, in principle, the view that some preferential treatment to States Parties would help to strengthen the NPT régime. On the other hand, he doubted whether preferential treatment would be compatible with the principle of equality among member States of international organizations, such as the IAEA. In his view, a policy of preferential treatment would hardly be applicable in the case of the IAEA, either from the legal or from the practical point of view. The Agency's Statute required that all member States, including those not parties to the NPT, should be treated on an equal footing; even if that stipulation did not exist, to expect States members of the IAEA that were not parties to the NPT to participate in a

consensus decision to adopt a policy which would operate to their detriment would be far from realistic. Speaking as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA, he did not think that the suggestion was practicable.

With regard to Japan's policy on exports of nuclear-related materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States, it took strict measures to ensure that its co-operation in matters involving non-proliferation considerations was limited exclusively to those countries which had acceded to the NPT and had accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. It wished that other exporting countries would take similarly strict measures. Furthermore, it saw a need for supplementary regulations to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and further strengthen the existing NPT régime. Such measures should not be intended to hamper exchanges in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; rather, they should facilitate international co-operation by further increasing mutual confidence among partners and motivate non-party States to accede to the Treaty. Lastly, with reference to the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), the IAEA Board of Governors had just received that Committee's report, which would be forwarded to the Agency's General Conference to be held in September 1990.

Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) drew attention to the working paper his delegation, together with others, had submitted on article III (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1). He also welcomed the paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1), which contained many useful ideas and would doubtless stimulate substantive discussion in the Committee. In preparing for the present Conference, his delegation had taken as its starting point the final document of the previous Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I), which had contained a significant and balanced review of technical co-operation developments in the five-year period preceding 1985, along with recommendations for the future. Those recommendations had, by and large, been heeded. Levels of multilateral nuclear co-operation had generally risen, in some areas quite significantly. IAEA's funding mechanisms were clearly working to the advantage of developing countries. Bilateral and regional nuclear co-operation among States Parties had continued to expand, with few indications of any new or significant problems. The link between supply and non-proliferation conditions continued to be examined within the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). Although no concrete results had been achieved on principles, a new spirit of common endeavour appeared to be emerging. Recent discussions within CAS showed that the supply/demand

situation had in some respects improved, and that supply problems between Parties had generally been resolved rapidly and satisfactorily. While it was not convinced of the need for a resumption of formal CAS meetings, his delegation none the less agreed that the important changes taking place in the policies of both older and new suppliers might make a renewal of discussions on principles desirable.

As to some of the detailed proposals of the Third Review Conference relating to the Agency's technical assistance activities, indicative planning figures had been set to ensure continued adequate funding for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. New regional co-operation agreements had been established for Latin America and Africa, and the regional agreement for Asia and the Pacific had continued to expand its range of activities and to provide a valuable service to Parties in that region. A paper on activities under the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific would be submitted to the present Conference. Another recommendation of the Third Review Conference had been given effect in that multi-year, multi-donor projects were now a reality.

The Agency's evaluation capacity had developed, although more resources were needed to ensure that technical assistance funds were used as effectively as possible. The IAEA had examined the scope for facilitating funding of nuclear power projects, and was taking account of the study's findings in developing its own programmes. Regional seminars were being conducted with a view to developing understanding of the needs both of national energy authorities and of financial institutions. Lastly, greater attention had been given to addressing the needs of the least developed countries, and his delegation would continue to work towards further enhancing that effort.

The Agency's background paper on article IV (NPT/CONF.IV/13) gave a balanced and helpful account of IAEA's technical assistance activities since the Third Review Conference. The improved flow of funds and the continuing strength of the commitment of NPT Parties to giving preferential treatment to other States Parties were best demonstrated in the record of footnote a/ projects. The IAEA continued to be the most important multilateral institution within the scope of article IV of the Treaty. Its activities in that field had shown that it was sensitive to the interests of all the member States, the overwhelming majority of which were Parties to the NPT. That point should be clearly reflected in the final document.

There were, of course, other avenues of technical co-operation, both multilateral and bilateral. In the multilateral field, an important role was being played by such United Nations bodies as UNDP, FAO and WHO, as well as by non-governmental bodies, institutes and industry groups which helped to create a stable environment for nuclear co-operation. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) was an important recent example. However, bilateral nuclear co-operation probably remained the single most important ingredient in world-wide nuclear co-operation activities. There had been a slump in demand for nuclear reactors, but the volume of co-operation worldwide and the range of power and non-power applications continued to expand. Australia had continued to play a full part in nuclear co-operation. It had maintained its contributions to TACF and was a major contributor to the Asia-Pacific RCA. It had bilateral nuclear co-operation programmes with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. It continued to be a major supplier of uranium for nuclear power generation, having exported 20,000 tons since the previous Review Conference under bilateral safeguards arrangements covering 20 States Parties to the Treaty. The agreements in question, which complemented IAEA safeguards and NPT objectives, had operated smoothly to the full satisfaction of all concerned. Australia also had bilateral arrangements covering other forms of nuclear technology, including the technology of disposal of high-level fuel-cycle waste products.

In its bilateral co-operation, his country adhered to a policy of strict preference for NPT Parties and also took carefully into account its obligations under articles II and III of the Treaty. Like those of other States Parties, Australia's activities were conditioned first and foremost by the existence of adequate safeguards against the diversion of transferred items for use in nuclear weapons or explosives. That issue would be examined fully in Main Committee II. Australia's international nuclear dealings also relied heavily on multilateral efforts to respond to the interrelated concerns of safety and environment. He welcomed the substantial international effort to alleviate the effects of the Chernobyl accident and eliminate the possibility of any recurrence, and also the IAEA's response to the Brundtland report. Similarly, he supported the continued focus of IAEA programmes directly aimed at ensuring that the nuclear power industry should remain as environmentally sound as possible and at developing nuclear techniques for use

in addressing environmental problems. Equally gratifying was the Agency's consideration of a code of practice for the transboundary movement of nuclear materials and waste and its contribution to the development of safety and other guidelines and to the consideration of nuclear liability issues, matters which were central to the nuclear industry and to the exchange of technology.

Mr. RASHID (Bangladesh) said that many of the elements crucial to the implementation of article IV had already been mentioned by the representative of Egypt, as well as by the representative of Indonesia in presenting the draft resolution of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1). His delegation fully supported the draft resolution and hoped that it would be favourably received by the Committee.

The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference had stressed the need for technology transfer and promotional co-operation between States Parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Transfer of technology in that field could contribute to the elimination of existing technical and economic gaps between developed and developing countries. Unfortunately, however, the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear applications were not reaching the developing countries among the Parties to the NPT. There was a growing feeling that some incentives should be accorded to the NPT developing countries so as to make the Treaty more attractive to other developing countries that were not parties to it. The non-proliferation régime could be strengthened only through universalization of the Treaty, and it was therefore essential to secure more accessions by granting preferential treatment to developing States Parties. The development aspect of the Treaty should be realized to the fullest extent and expenditures on technical co-operation should be comparable to the level of expenditures on safeguards activities. Clearly, the developed countries must do their utmost to enable the NPT developing countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In the view of his delegation, article IV should encompass co-operation in all energy areas, and not just in the field of nuclear energy. In order to run a nuclear power facility, a country needed a sizeable electrical grid, experience in handling complex energy systems and back-up electricity sources in the event of unforeseen circumstances forcing a shut-down. Many developing countries, in particular the least developed, were unable to meet their electricity needs, and it was therefore essential to give broad assistance to the NPT developing countries in improving their energy systems so that they

could reap the full benefits of nuclear energy. In that context, his delegation intended to submit a proposal for incorporation in the draft resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1.

Mr. IONESCU (Romania) said that his country had adopted a programme to promote the use of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity and for non-energy purposes. It had concluded bilateral agreements on the transfer of equipment, materials and technology, was implementing safeguards and had taken measures to prevent proliferation.

Romania received technical assistance from the IAEA, which was to be congratulated on its efforts during the period under review, and had benefited from international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, within the framework of the NPT. An Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) had been sent to evaluate a nuclear plant under construction; a Waste Management Advisory Programme (WAMAP) mission had examined radioactive waste disposal; and a Radiation Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) had looked into questions relating to radiation protection. In June 1990, agreements had been reached with the Agency on the transfer of low-enriched fuels for a safeguarded research reactor in Romania.

In view of the positive developments in international relations, actual prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the major objective supported by most States, should be achieved by means of co-operation between partners engaged in a joint endeavour. It was necessary to work towards enhancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, expanding international co-operation in that area and improving the safety of nuclear power plants in operation or under construction. All States Parties to the Treaty must have better access to safeguarded nuclear energy and technology transfer. Greater support must be given to the Agency's technical assistance missions, and the use of nuclear techniques must be stepped up in industry, agriculture, medicine and other sectors. The nuclear materials recovered in the disarmament process must be recycled for peaceful uses in non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the Conference must consider ways of protecting nuclear facilities from attack and ensure that its conclusions on that question were reflected in the final document.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

PROVISIONAL

For participants only

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18 September 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

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Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3)
(continued):

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful
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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3)
(agenda item 13) (continued)

Mr. ALER (Sweden) observed that his delegation, with others, had submitted proposals for the form of language on articles IV and V to be used in the final document. It had also studied with interest the proposals contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, prepared by the Group of Non-Aligned States.

Following the tragedy of Chernobyl, there had been a great effort to intensify international co-operation on nuclear safety and radiological protection, primarily under the auspices of the IAEA. The IAEA General Conference would shortly be discussing a very comprehensive report by the Board of Governors and the Director General, outlining a programme of action for the 1990s on the whole subject of the safety of nuclear installations, radiological protection and waste management. A special high-level conference would be held in 1991 to cover the entire field of safety, on which occasion his delegation hoped that it would be possible to reach agreement on a set of fundamental safety principles, possibly of a mandatory nature, for the guidance of national authorities. Sweden did not believe that the IAEA should assume the role of an international safety inspector, as had been suggested in the general debate, for the ultimate responsibility must lie with national safety authorities and with Governments. The IAEA could, however, increase its assistance through the mechanism to send international expert missions to countries that so required, and technically developed countries should be urged to make experts available for such tasks. Nuclear safety remained an international concern and, in that context, he hoped that the proposals to be made by Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden, on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations, for the draft final document, would meet with general approval.

In the period under review, the IAEA had strengthened its role as the main instrument for international co-operation in peaceful nuclear applications. While the IAEA report (NPT/CONF.IV/13) gave a detailed account of activities and resources during the period, it did not give the whole picture and followed the practice of earlier Review Conferences of listing, inter alia, contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and extra-budgetary contributions for technical assistance. However, considerable extra-budgetary resources were also given in support of co-operative research programmes and other activities. In addition to the

amounts listed in the Agency report, Sweden, for example, had contributed some \$3 million over the previous five years, primarily for agriculture and environmental protection. He therefore proposed that the Agency be asked to review its practice when reporting to the next Review Conference, so as to provide a more comprehensive picture.

Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that, although Canada was a medium-sized industrial power, it had developed an important nuclear industry based on a unique reactor type known as CANDU and on extensive expertise related to peaceful nuclear disciplines. With 19 reactors in operation, nuclear power accounted for some 18 per cent of Canada's electricity production. In March 1990, the Government had announced a number of measures to strengthen the nuclear industry because it believed that it was important for economic, environmental and energy-related reasons. At the same time, Canada remained the world's largest exporter of uranium, exporting nearly 10,000 tons a year since 1985 to a wide variety of countries. As an important nuclear supplier for peaceful purposes, Canada believed that the NPT was an absolutely essential framework to ensure that international nuclear commerce would not contribute to proliferation. Without the NPT-based system, there would be much less peaceful nuclear exchange than was the case at present.

Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty created special responsibilities for countries such as Canada to facilitate exchanges of nuclear technology within an appropriate non-proliferation framework. There had been a number of developments in peaceful nuclear energy since the previous Review Conference and his delegation wished to consider them in connection with the implementation of article IV. Document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1 covered a number of successes and further challenges pertaining to the implementation of article IV and, taken in connection with document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, should provide an excellent basis for the Committee to formulate language for the final document. A balanced assessment of article IV must consider the responsibility of States parties to the NPT to facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation, together with factors - political, economic and technical - which might constrain such co-operation and, above all, the overriding need to ensure a secure non-proliferation framework.

The NPT framework facilitated the development of bilateral nuclear co-operation between States Parties in mutually agreeable circumstances, but it did not obligate every NPT supplier State to enter into bilateral nuclear co-operation with every other NPT State Party. Bilateral nuclear co-operation

remained a sovereign decision and might not reasonably be possible in certain situations. Second, the bilateral co-operation agreements required by Canada and other supplier States and the adherence by supplier States to arrangements such as the London Supplier Guidelines responded to legitimate non-proliferation concerns. While they were based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such bilateral and multilateral arrangements could legitimately contain additional requirements covering, for example, a situation where the IAEA could not apply safeguards. Export controls, bilateral requirements and multilateral arrangements by nuclear supplier States responded to the demands of their public to ensure that their nuclear items were not diverted for explosive devices. They represented a complement to the NPT and made nuclear co-operation easier. Third, as recent studies by the CAS had demonstrated, the international nuclear power market since 1985 had generally been characterized by an absence of demand rather than problems relating to security of supply. The safety, technical and financial demands of nuclear power accounted largely for such a situation, particularly in developing countries. Because of that, as well as the emergence of new suppliers, his delegation did not attach particularly high priority to a rapid conclusion to CAS work on principles of security of supply unless equal commitments to non-proliferation could be assured within that context. Similarly, it believed that commercial nuclear contracts could be and had been generally respected.

Fourth, notwithstanding the current depressed demand situation for nuclear power in most parts of the world, his delegation believed that the advantages of nuclear power as a cost-effective and environmentally advantageous source of electricity would ultimately result in an increase in demand in both developed and developing countries, particularly if nuclear safety and waste management concerns could be resolved. Canada believed that the IAEA had fully considered the potential contribution of nuclear power to sustainable development and that the Review Conference should recognize those recent developments in the role of nuclear power. Fifth, the importance of nuclear safety should be recognized, particularly since the tragic Chernobyl accident, as should increased international co-operation in the areas related to nuclear safety. In that respect, the IAEA had done exemplary work in developing conventions on early warnings and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident with transboundary consequences, in establishing guidelines for the siting, design and construction of nuclear facilities, and in international transactions in nuclear waste, radiological protection and waste

management programmes and assessment of nuclear plants. Canadian resources and officials had participated extensively in such IAEA programmes, thus representing fulfilment of the article IV ideal. Moreover, the IAEA's technical co-operation programme was the pre-eminent multilateral framework for the realization of article IV. The fact that the vast majority of its funds came from and were allocated to NPT States Parties represented a major contribution to the observance of article IV. Besides its IAEA budget contribution, Canada contributed about \$US 1 million a year to the rapidly growing voluntary fund, which was supplemented by multi-donor projects and successful regional arrangements in Latin America and Africa.

While the Conference should strongly support such progress in making nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear application available to developing countries through the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, it should be cautious in calling for massive increases in the Fund, much less creating new funds at a time of financial restraint in international organizations. As a supplier State, Canada was aware of the technical and financial constraints facing developing countries in trying to develop nuclear power programmes. There was no easy way to overcome such difficulties, but the IAEA had made good progress in studying the problem and making recommendations. None the less, more remained to be done by international financial organizations and the nuclear industry itself. Canada stood ready to participate in discussions on how to overcome the financial constraints in promoting nuclear power in developing countries.

The 1985 Review Conference had also requested that States Parties should recount in written form their experiences in bilateral co-operation measures to further the implementation of article IV. Canada had prepared a paper pointing out that, because it made NPT adherence and NPT-type safeguards a prerequisite for full nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States, it clearly gave preference to NPT parties. It had full nuclear co-operation with 28 States, many of which were developing countries, and CANDU reactors were in operation in the Republic of Korea, under construction in Romania and under consideration in a variety of NPT countries, including Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and Hungary. Canada was prepared to provide limited assistance for the safe and efficient operation of Canadian-supplied CANDU reactors in Argentina, India and Pakistan but, true to its commitment to the NPT, would not consider the resumption of full nuclear co-operation with those countries until they accepted the NPT and full-scope safeguards. Canadian uranium exports to the United States of America, Japan, the Republic of Korea and

Europe required the same non-proliferation framework as did exports of reactors and other trigger-list items: NPT adherence and a full bilateral nuclear co-operation relationship. Full Canadian nuclear co-operation was characterized by extensive technology transfer, a particularly good example being Canada's relationship with the Republic of Korea. The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board also offered advice and training to nuclear regulatory bodies, and Canadian universities and research institutes had received foreign nuclear experts studying nuclear technology. His country was also a major supplier of nuclear equipment and material for health, cancer therapy, agriculture, food irradiation and industry. It supplied about 65 per cent of all bulk isotopes made available in the world and lent some financial assistance for nuclear exports, particularly to developing countries.

Mr. STOIBER (United States of America), commenting on his delegation's overall assessment of the role of the NPT in facilitating peaceful nuclear co-operation, said that, in his message to the Conference, President Bush had noted that the Treaty's "contributions to the development of nuclear power have helped to improve the quality of life around the globe" and that the Treaty "remains a hallmark in our long quest for peace and for peaceful nuclear co-operation among nations". In that connection he also referred to the statement of the head of his delegation in the general debate.

He believed that the report of Committee III should begin with a strong endorsement of the Treaty as the best foundation for continued nuclear co-operation among nations and a positive assessment of the record under the NPT over the past five years. The issue was not one of whether co-operative nuclear activities had reached the levels desired by all; in a world of competing demands for resources and at a time when all nations were experiencing economic difficulties, that was not a reasonable standard for judgement. Rather, it should be asked what the picture of nuclear co-operation would look like without the framework provided by the Treaty. In his opinion, it would be far different and less positive; without the clear and binding assurances against misuse contained in the Treaty, there would be a great reluctance to transfer materials, equipment and technology which could help a country move in the direction of nuclear weapons.

As to activities by the United States, he drew attention to document NPT/CONF.IV/20 and to the section entitled "Fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". For those nations which might hear arguments that the flow of nuclear co-operation had somehow diminished over the past five years, he would refer them to pages 8 to 16 of that document.

One matter sometimes neglected in discussion of international nuclear co-operation under article IV was the important role played by private industry in the transfer of technology in such an important area, a point mentioned in paragraph 6 of document NPT/CONF.IV/4. While it was at times easy to forget that article IV spoke not of "assistance" but of the commitment of parties to "exchange" and to "co-operate", his Government believed that the report of the Conference should find a place where the important role of private industry could be recognized. In that respect, he commended the statement on the Treaty circulated by the Uranium Institute as a valuable contribution to the work of the Conference.

The work of the Conference should also include a balanced and objective look at the most important events having affected international nuclear co-operation under the Treaty, the most significant of which had been the tragic reactor accident at Chernobyl, an incident fundamentally affecting both government and public attitudes towards nuclear energy. Its lessons should be reflected in the Conference's final document. Prior to April 1986, the nuclear power debate had been diffuse, focusing sometimes on waste management issues, sometimes on proliferation risks and sometimes on costs. Since then, it had become focused on and dominated by the consideration of nuclear safety. None the less, terrible as the consequences had been in human terms and much as they had had an adverse effect on the plans of many nations for exploiting nuclear energy for development, the event had had some positive consequences in nuclear co-operation, including the negotiation in a remarkably short time of two important multilateral conventions - on assistance in nuclear or radiological emergencies and an early notification of nuclear accidents. Also, at the Special Session of the IAEA General Conference in September 1986, important consensus conclusions had been reached concerning the uses of nuclear energy. The final document of that Special Session addressed such fundamental issues as the role of nuclear energy, the responsibility of States in using it, international co-operation and, the role of the IAEA. The report of the Review Conference should take positive note of the response to Chernobyl, including the assessment of the causes of the accident conducted under the auspices of the IAEA and the continuing co-operative efforts, both inside and outside the IAEA, to address the fundamental problem of nuclear safety. Some mention should also be made of the efforts under way to develop smaller and more passively safe reactors which would help meet the needs of developing nations without problems caused by earlier generations of technology.

Another event which should find a place in the Committee's report was the 1987 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE). The Conference had been over 10 years in the making and had been held only one year after the Chernobyl accident; there could be no doubt that it represented an important bench-mark in multilateral nuclear co-operation outside the usual framework of the IAEA. However, care should be taken to provide an accurate and balanced assessment of UNCPICPUNE, rather than focus on only one of its dimensions. It had been a remarkably successful example of the kind of nuclear technology exchange envisaged by article IV of the NPT. In its Committee II, over 103 technical papers had been presented, under seven categories, on the broadest range of nuclear subjects. An accurate assessment of that Conference was reflected in paragraph 29 of document NPT/CONF.IV/4. In line with that assessment, his delegation would hope to see those practical and positive results recorded in any statement the Committee would wish to make on UNCPICPUNE.

Another aspect of the UNCPICPUNE had been the effort in Committee I to reach agreement on a number of universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on ways and means for promoting such co-operation in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations regarding non-proliferation. That subject was also related to the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). His Government had actively participated for many years in the effort to define a range of universal principles and, while it was disappointed that the effort had not met with success, its assessment of the reasons and the relevant conclusions with regard to future efforts differed from the perspectives of some other delegations.

First, he strongly believed that the NPT and the work of past Review Conferences represented a rather coherent and satisfactory set of principles of nuclear co-operation which could be universally approved as a basis for exchanges between nations in that field. Second, the primary reason for the frustrated efforts in other forums to define universally acceptable principles rested primarily on the fact that a small number of Governments did not agree that the NPT and its central concept of full-scope safeguards represented an acceptable condition for the conduct of international nuclear co-operation. His Government did not therefore see an overwhelming need to look beyond the framework established by the NPT and its related instruments and practices to try and establish a new set of so-called "universal principles". The

United States Government had repeatedly affirmed its support for the CAS process and considered that recent CAS efforts had made a positive contribution to an understanding of nuclear supply issues during the present period. However, it had doubts about the wisdom of resuming consideration of universal principles within the context of CAS until two clear factors were present: firstly, a genuine need for such principles to provide for meaningful international co-operation and, secondly, some reasonable prospect that there could be consensus agreement on such principles to be presented to the IAEA Board of Governors. His Government would be particularly reluctant to embark on a divisive and controversial debate which would polarize the nuclear community at a time when a unified and positive approach was badly needed for the nuclear option to continue. Consequently, on the issue of principles of supply, his delegation would wish to see a final document that recorded past efforts to achieve agreement and did not attempt to cast blame for the results of the process to date. It would further wish to leave the question of pursuing universal principles in CAS to the chairman of that Committee in consultation with its members.

The Review Conference should be placed on record as favouring the adoption of full-scope safeguards as a requirement for nuclear supply by all parties to the Treaty, as well as other suppliers. His delegation saw the relation between articles III and IV in that context as very important in providing a sound basis for international nuclear commerce. Those who had drafted the Treaty had wisely understood that a nation's acceptance of safeguards covering its entire nuclear programme established a clear presumption that it was devoted only to acceptable, peaceful purposes. Those nations which had accepted such safeguards should be reinforced in that commitment by the knowledge that such a step conferred concrete and specific benefits in "the terms of nuclear trade". As a matter of both law and policy, the United States had long implemented the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear commerce and took very positive note of the recent decisions by Japan and Germany to pursue a similar policy. It therefore strongly supported the inclusion of such a recommendation in the report of the Committee and in the final document of the Conference.

As to the effort to promote nuclear development, with emphasis on the financing of nuclear power or research reactor projects, he believed that it would be appropriate for the Conference to commend the valuable contribution made by the IAEA expert Working Group, comprising representatives of nuclear

energy agencies in a number of developing countries, of export credit agencies in several developed nations and of the World Bank, UNIDO and the IAEA, and which had published in 1987 a document on the promotion and financing of nuclear power programmes in developing countries. The report was balanced and its recommendations deserved to be given the closest attention by individual nations, international lending agencies, commercial credit institutions and the IAEA. Its balance stemmed from the fact that it recognized the multifaceted nature of the task of promoting nuclear reactor development and did not place undue emphasis on any of the many problems in the field or hold out false hopes that a single solution could unlock the door to major resources for nuclear development. It identified such key elements as public acceptance, project preparation, adequate planning, industrial and technical infrastructure and a regulatory framework in addition to financing, as being important. Future efforts, particularly those in the IAEA, should continue to emphasise all elements in the task of mounting a successful nuclear programme.

The financing of nuclear power projects involving foreign-supplied technology was normally provided through export credit agencies supported by Governments of supplier States. In the United States, it was provided by the Export-Import Bank. While the size of export credit agency loans, their terms and conditions varied considerably with the nature of the equipment and services being provided, such an export credit approach was not totally unregulated. Since August 1984, the credit agencies of most nuclear suppliers had based their lending decisions on the so-called OECD consensus or Sector Understanding on Nuclear Power Plants. His country believed that that consensus introduced desirable consistency into an extremely complex credit process. At the same time, his Government would not favour proposals to extend significant subsidies to nuclear projects through concessional credits. Such a course would distort economic decision-making on electric power generating projects and conceivably increase already high debt burdens for nations experiencing economic difficulties. Multilateral credit institutions, including the World Bank, should evaluate nuclear power as one option when assessing a borrowing country's electric power programme. He supported the present approach of multilateral banks of selecting the type of power plant for a loan on the basis of least cost, with appropriate consideration of environmental and other factors, and believed that adequate financing could be made available for nuclear power projects through existing institutions and lending arrangements in those cases where the elements identified in the 1987 IAEA expert study had been clearly established.

As far as the structure and content of the Committee's report were concerned, the rather brief period of time available for review meant that it was difficult to produce an extensive final document touching on all the issues many delegations might have wished to cover. Other multilateral nuclear meetings had wisely decided that the primary institution for international nuclear co-operation - the IAEA - was the right place to keep the central focus of efforts in that area. He therefore envisaged a rather short report, similar to the 1985 report in length, touching on the most important issues arising from article IV. The 1985 Final Document also provided a useful model with regard to structure, although if a more logical ordering of topical sections could be worked out, he would have no difficulty in supporting a different arrangement. Lastly, his delegation would be submitting texts of several short paragraphs on issues raised in his statement, as a contribution to drafting the Committee's report.

Mr. NEFEDOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the current abundance of materials, equipment and services was conducive to enhancing widespread use of nuclear energy. International co-operation was progressing and in recent years, the Agency's technical assistance budget had grown. In the view of his delegation, it was essential for States Parties that could make materials, equipment and services available to increase their voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and to technical assistance projects in the developing States Parties.

The Soviet Union remained faithful to the principles of providing international co-operation on an equal footing and of granting assistance to developing countries and regions in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Since the Third Review Conference, the USSR had greatly increased such co-operation, focusing primarily on questions related to the safe development, increased efficiency and reliability of nuclear energy, as well as environmental protection and a reduction in the use of fossil fuels. It was providing assistance to a number of Eastern European countries to allow them to manufacture equipment for a variety of reactor types and, more recently, to build their own nuclear reactors. Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic were also co-operating in the Soviet Union on the construction of the Khmel'nitskiy nuclear power facility, which would then deliver electricity to those countries over the next 20 years in proportion to their contribution to the construction project.

Following the Chernobyl accident, increasing emphasis had been placed in the USSR and throughout the world on improving reactor safety. That was the goal of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), of which the Soviet Union was one of the founders, the constituent conference having been held in May 1989 in Moscow. WANO was currently examining questions relating to the modernization of the first generation of reactors in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union had proposed that a scientific research project be undertaken on alleviating the biological impact of the radiological emergency brought about by the Chernobyl accident. Some 26 States had expressed their interest, and his Government was completing the preparations in association with the IAEA.

His delegation stressed the importance of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. The Soviet Union had regularly increased its voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, usually exceeding the recommended amounts, 3.5 million roubles having been allocated in 1989, compared with 2.6 million roubles in 1985. It also made funds available to the Agency for technical assistance in developing States Parties to the Treaty. For the period 1991-1994, 2 million roubles would be earmarked for that purpose. His country was currently implementing 19 major contracts with the IAEA to supply equipment and materials valued at more than 6 million roubles. Preparations were under way to sign another 20 major contracts with the Agency for a total of 10 million roubles. Bangladesh, Mexico, Egypt, Portugal, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland and other countries had received or were receiving supplies. The Soviet Union was also conducting various study courses and on-site training programmes through the IAEA.

His Government continued to favour granting non-weapon-States Parties preferential treatment for the supply of equipment, materials and information in the nuclear field and in accordance with its obligations under the Treaty, the Soviet Union provided supplies to such non-nuclear-weapon States on the condition that they agreed to apply Agency safeguards. The USSR had never refused to grant technical or commercial assistance or to supply nuclear materials or equipment to States Parties for political reasons. Obviously, it would continue to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world and to meet its contractual and legal obligations in that regard. Lastly, his delegation hoped that some of its proposals would be reflected in the Committee's final document.

Mr. VERBEEK (Netherlands), commenting on the draft resolution submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1) said that the information made available on bilateral nuclear co-operation by a number of participants in the Review Conference showed how unjustified it was to express, in the second preambular paragraph of that document, "dissatisfaction" with the implementation of article IV and related provisions of the Treaty. There was ample proof that, over the past five years, international co-operation had continued to increase, particularly in the areas of non-energy-related nuclear applications and of nuclear safety and radiological protection. The record had also revealed an increase in international co-operation in nuclear power production. The reason for the small number of new nuclear power projects in developing countries lay in the reassessment of national nuclear policies after the Chernobyl accident, the availability and economic attractiveness of other energy sources and the scarcity of resources in many developing countries for financing nuclear power projects, rather than any unwillingness on the part of supplier States.

The analysis of the relationship between supplier and recipient States, as contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, struck his delegation as somewhat outdated, in particular the motives ascribed to supplier States, such as the reference in operative paragraph 7 to non-proliferation "as a pretext" and in the sixth preambular paragraph to "discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States party to the Treaty", as well as the claim in the ninth preambular paragraph that certain measures were "in contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty". Those and similar obsolete phrases had been coined some 20 years previously, and it was surprising to see them re-emerge.

Supplier-recipient relations had been discussed at great length in the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and during the UNCPICPUNE and its preparatory process. Although no final agreement had been reached on a list of peaceful nuclear co-operation principles, it should be acknowledged that the CAS had come very close to agreeing on one. The time might, indeed, have come, as suggested in operative paragraph 13, to resume formal discussions in the CAS. The setting up of a consultative mechanism among States Parties to examine supply problems, as suggested in operative paragraph 6, would then be superfluous.

His delegation questioned the reasoning in operative paragraph 8 (a), (b) and (c). For example, subparagraph (a) appeared to reject all preconditions for access to nuclear material and equipment, yet subparagraph (b) deemed it useful for the IAEA Board of Governors to reach agreement on conditions for non-proliferation requirements. Again, subparagraph (c) made the sympathetic suggestion that preferential treatment should be given to the developing countries. The notion of a free transfer of nuclear technology was somewhat theoretical. In reality, nuclear co-operation could take place only on the basis of an agreement between recipient and supplier on non-proliferation objectives and a clear understanding and full implementation of the measures arrived at. Over the past decade, a wide range of such agreements had been developed in the CAS among suppliers and recipients, in particular among States Parties to the NPT. Those measures went beyond the application of IAEA safeguards; they also pertained to physical protection measures, specific measures concerning retransfers and the management of nuclear materials after use or in cases of further fuel-cycle steps. In practice, suppliers and recipients usually had little difficulty reaching agreement on such measures. When they could not, it might be that one of the parties involved had not committed itself unequivocally to non-proliferation, for example by becoming a Party to the Treaty, or that the bilateral relationship between the parties involved did not favour bilateral co-operation in general, let alone in nuclear matters. How could States that had serious bilateral difficulties be forced to co-operate on nuclear energy as though they maintained friendly relations.

In the view of his Government, the implementation of article IV had been successful on the whole. Co-operation within the IAEA had been quite satisfactory and advantageous for the parties concerned, and it was to be hoped that that trend could be continued in the coming five years, especially if, in the light of recent political developments and environmental considerations, Governments decided to reduce the use of fossil fuels.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said that his country had made every effort to develop nuclear energy while faithfully adhering to the letter and the spirit of the NPT régime.

More than half of the Republic of Korea's total electricity, one of the highest proportions in the world, was provided by nuclear power from 9 units with an installed capacity of 7,000 MW. By the turn of the century, 14 nuclear power plants would become operational.

The Republic of Korea intended to step up co-operation with supplier countries to enhance domestic capability and enhance nuclear safety. His Government was grateful for the assistance provided by supplier States and the IAEA in launching nuclear development projects. The time had come for the Republic of Korea to share its experiences and know-how with other developing countries through international arrangements, namely the IAEA framework, and in keeping with its technological and financial capability. To that end, it had organized and financed regional training courses on nuclear power project planning and implementation under the auspices of the IAEA since 1988. The third training course, with participants from a dozen developing countries, was scheduled for October 1990.

Strengthening the NPT régime was an essential pre-condition for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the régime should not jeopardize the inalienable right of any State Party to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. The fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technological information must be made available to the Parties concerned, provided that transactions were made with full-scope safeguards. Preferential treatment should, of course, be given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. It was to be hoped that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy would be resumed, and more effective nuclear technology transfer mechanisms among developing countries must be explored within the NPT régime, by developed and developing countries alike.

Mr. ITALIANI (Italy) stressed the great importance that Italy attached to full implementation of article IV of the NPT, the best proof being his Government's considerable efforts to further a number of peaceful applications of nuclear energy in developing countries through bilateral agreements as well as through the IAEA, in particular by financing the International Centre for Theoretical Physics.

Further development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy could only be visualized if very strict safety criteria were implemented. At present, the safety régime basically relied on national regulations which were already supplemented by many actions at the international level. A strengthening of the international safety régime would further increase the degree of safety reached in the various States and would also make for more public confidence in the nuclear sector.

The implementation of Nuclear Safety Standards essentially involved the authorities at national level. Since the volume of activities was substantial, it would be impossible to transfer them completely to an international organization. Application procedures must therefore continue mainly at the national level. It was none the less possible to envisage procedures for permanent verification at an international level, aimed at assessing the adequacy of the activities carried out in the individual countries. An international control unit could assess the quality of the safety régimes implemented in the individual countries.

For that purpose, it would be necessary in the first place to review the control procedures existing in the various countries, a review that had already been started by the IAEA. Any possible gaps would then be bridged and existing procedures would be harmonized and rationalized. Mechanisms would be operated for continuous verification of the quality of the national safety régimes, relying on the implementation of adequate Quality Guarantees programmes possibly tailored to each individual country or group of countries. Lastly, verification and controls would be carried out by the IAEA in accordance with the criteria of such missions as OSART, ASSET and RAPAT. The missions, however, should be made not only on request by the countries concerned, as was the case now, but also on a systematic basis by a decision of the IAEA. Integrated safety missions should also be envisaged to cover all safety aspects of nuclear installations.

Such a system of tests and verification should be the subject of an international agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the IAEA, along with regional agreements. In the case of the European Economic Community, that task could be entrusted to Euratom, which would act upon delegation by the IAEA in the framework of a specific agreement similar to the verification agreement negotiated on NPT safeguards.

His delegation was submitting a working paper (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.2) on the subject, suggesting specific language for inclusion in the final document. The paper submitted by Australia and nine other countries (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1) contained much valuable material, but it did not go far enough on the issue of nuclear safety and he therefore urged the sponsors to strengthen their paper on that point.

Not all of IAEA's technical assistance was given through the Technical Assistance Department and reflected in the technical assistance report. In IAEA's Board of Governors, he, as a Governor, had repeatedly urged the secretariat to include in the annual report a compendium encompassing all

types of technical assistance given by and through the IAEA, including assistance by other departments, such as the Centre for Theoretical Physics. Some \$1 million a year of technical assistance was provided through the IAEA regular budget and \$500,000 annually by UNESCO. His country also made a voluntary contribution.

Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that he would confine his remarks to signalling the issues which his country hoped to see reflected in the Committee's report.

Ireland had associated itself with a text (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1), circulated by a group of like-minded countries, that reflected their view on the issues raised by a review of article IV. His delegation strongly commended the text as a basis for the Main Committee's final report to the Drafting Committee. His country gave strong and unqualified support to the NPT, which it regarded first and foremost as a treaty aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was in that framework that his delegation viewed international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The discussions on the implementation of article IV of the NPT had to take the binding commitment to non-proliferation into account.

The Government of Ireland recognized the need to establish an equitable and stable framework for nuclear trade and co-operation. He believed that article IV had never been intended to prescribe a code of conduct for nuclear co-operation. The article provided the basis, but not the elements, for formulating a framework which would allow international trade to flourish, while avoiding the risks of nuclear proliferation. The authors of the NPT had intended that that framework should rise above the risk of discrimination between trading partners and avoid frustration of its objectives by commercial rivalry between exporting countries. However, because of the inextricable linkage between nuclear non-proliferation and co-operation, NPT Parties deserved special attention in the regulation of nuclear exchanges for peaceful uses.

The final report should reaffirm the undertakings of the Parties to the NPT in accordance with article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs. That reaffirmation should strengthen the contribution to progress in general and to the elimination of technological gaps between developed and developing countries. It believed that the problems of least developed countries merited special care. The Conference should, in addition, express support for the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). The

measures recommended by the CAS would deal with the need for predictable long-term supply and also with the important aspect of non-proliferation.

In the general debate in plenary, his country's Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed Ireland's view that nuclear power programmes should be generated in accordance with the highest possible safety standards and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. The present Conference should express concern about the risks posed by nuclear energy and encourage efforts to deal with them in the IAEA and elsewhere.

His Government was pursuing elsewhere the idea of an international nuclear inspection force to verify safety standards for the benefit of nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon States alike. The establishment of such an inspection force would greatly help to restore credibility to the nuclear industry, where the idea of inspection was not a new one. Safeguards inspectors already fulfilled an inspection function of a kind. Yet it was not enough to call for closures of badly designed installations and for new safety standards: a new worldwide openness was necessary in dealing with safety issues. The Conference could not ignore the extraordinary tragedy of Chernobyl. To fulfil the spirit and the letter of article IV of the NPT, it must rise to the challenge posed by the need for safety and radiological protection. His delegation stood ready to co-operate with others in formulating appropriate language to reflect that concern and it welcomed the ideas put forward by the Italian delegation in that regard. His delegation welcomed the Conference on Nuclear Safety, to be held in 1991 by the IAEA. That Conference, which had been proposed by Ireland on behalf of the European Community, would greatly help to strengthen international co-operation in relation to nuclear safety. Concerns about safety called for a culture that was capable of attaching priority to safety rather than to production and profit.

It was gratifying to note the continued growth of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme, the importance of which ought to be mentioned in the final document. The fact that the IAEA's assistance had been chiefly required in the non-power uses of nuclear energy was especially welcome.

The question of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations had received serious attention at the Third Review Conference. It was still relevant and should be discussed in the final report, which should speak of the need for concrete steps to provide assurances against such attacks. His delegation welcomed the useful working paper and informal text circulated on the subject by a number of delegations.

Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) said that the Committee's report should reaffirm the continuing validity of the central principles contained in the NPT, review the application of those principles over the past five years and also look at how they should be applied in the years to come. The principles themselves were unchanged but history had not stood still and care should therefore be taken to stick to issues which were relevant to the present time.

His delegation had circulated a paper containing language which could be incorporated into the report. It contained a short passage on article V identical with that in the 1985 report. As to article IV, the text set forth the main areas which his delegation believed should be covered. The first was the importance of stressing that the NPT provided a framework of confidence for world-wide development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without it, nuclear co-operation between States would be much more difficult.

The second point was the importance of recalling and restating the basic principles contained in article IV and of emphasizing that the rights of all parties set out in the article must be exercised in conformity with earlier articles. The need should be recognized for predictable long-term supply assurances to be matched by effective assurances on non-proliferation.

The third point was the importance of nuclear co-operation in extending the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. Support for continuing programmes of technical assistance should be emphasized and the value of IAEA's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme stressed, as well as the mechanism which allowed extra-budgetary funds to be channelled to projects in developing States parties to the NPT. The appreciable level of bilateral co-operation should also be noted.

The fourth point concerned nuclear safety, which clearly called for greater emphasis than it had in 1985. The Conference should place on record its sympathy for all those affected by the Chernobyl disaster and stress all that had been done in the framework of the IAEA to strengthen co-operation in the field of nuclear safety - in particular the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, to which all States should be urged to adhere.

Lastly, on the question of discrimination by nuclear suppliers, the rights and obligations set out in article IV could not be considered in complete isolation. They depended on faithful observance, by all Parties, of the

preceding articles. A non-nuclear-weapon State which wished to enjoy the benefits of co-operation under article IV had first to accede to the NPT; it had then to conclude a safeguards agreement in accordance with article III (4), and thereafter, it had to continue to comply with its obligations and avoid any actions which might give rise to suspicion that it was not doing so.

The supplier States, for their part, were actually called upon by the Treaty to discriminate. The definition of the precise meaning of the obligation under article III (2) was a question to which the supplier States had rightly devoted much attention, some of them insisting on full-scope safeguards, which meant in practice that they discriminated against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to an extent greater than the Treaty prescribed. Many States Parties wished to see all supplier States adopt full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, and the United Kingdom was prepared to join a consensus of major suppliers to that effect.

The loudest accusations of discrimination came, of course, from States not parties to the Treaty. It was indeed true that the supplier States discriminated against those States and would continue to do so. On the other hand, it was quite incorrect to suggest that efforts made by the suppliers to fulfil their Treaty obligations constituted discriminatory policy against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The United Kingdom fully recognized its obligations under article IV, but also felt bound to have regard at all times to its obligations under articles I and III.

Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria), stressing the importance his country attached to the implementation of article IV, expressed appreciation for the IAEA's crucial role in facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific information in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency's programme had expanded considerably since 1985, continuous improvements being achieved in both the quality and the effectiveness of its technical co-operation projects. His delegation would wish to see the Conference acknowledge the importance of the work of the IAEA as a principal agent for technology transfer under article IV (2) and commended for the effectiveness of its Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme. It joined other delegations in calling for a substantial increase in the Agency's financial and human resources, as well as in the extrabudgetary resources for footnote a/ projects, from which Nigeria, for one, had greatly benefited.

As to the statement made by an earlier speaker to the effect that, while preferential treatment in terms of technical assistance was acceptable in the context of the NPT, its application within the IAEA would be difficult from the legal and practical points of view, he would point out that some kind of reward had to be offered to countries which had given up their nuclear weapon option in the interests of global stability and security. He saw no conflict in the application of preferential treatment to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty within the IAEA, particularly in respect of projects funded through extrabudgetary resources. It was his hope that the Conference would reaffirm the decision of the Third Review Conference urging that preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such a reaffirmation would also serve as a political message emphasizing the rights and obligations of States Parties.

The issue of the IAEA's assistance in securing finance from outside sources for nuclear power projects in the developing countries remained unresolved and would have to be addressed before those countries could enjoy the benefits of nuclear power generation. Special attention should also be given to the needs of those developing countries which wished to acquire a research reactor as a first step towards a nuclear power programme. His delegation urged the IAEA to continue its search for ways of financing nuclear power programmes for developing countries and welcomed its efforts in the development of small- and medium-power reactors, as well as its intention to offer developing countries integrated assistance in developing their infrastructures for execution of nuclear power programmes, including the training of personnel.

Priority attention should be given to the development of high levels of nuclear safety. The Conference should acknowledge the importance of safety and radiation protection and the increased efforts of the IAEA to strengthen international co-operation in that field.

On the subject of Regional Co-operative Agreements, he noted the successes achieved in agriculture under the RCA for Asia and the Pacific and in the training of scientists in Latin America under ARCAL. Expressing the hope that the African Regional Co-operative Agreement, which was expected to become operational in 1991, would receive the necessary support from outside Africa, he noted with satisfaction the statement made by the representative of Japan

announcing the attendance of two senior Japanese officials at the inaugural meeting of AFRA. The contribution of all non-African countries intending to attend the meeting would be highly appreciated.

Notwithstanding the Agency's conclusion that "in the view of most suppliers, the present situation was not one of supply assurance but rather of demand assurance" (NPT/CONF.IV/13, annex II (a)), his delegation took the view that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply should continue to monitor the supply situation on a long-term basis.

Nigeria, which had consistently supported the strict application of full-scope safeguards, viewed with concern the relatively easier access which some non-parties seemed to have enjoyed and which had enabled some of them to acquire nuclear-weapon capabilities. It would be ironic if the non-proliferation régime were applied to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in such a way as to constitute an obstacle to their development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation would wish to see the Conference reaffirm that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any State Party to the Treaty to engage in peaceful nuclear activities.

Lastly, he fully supported the draft resolution of the Group of Non-Aligned States contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1.

Mr. SAVERYS (Belgium) said that the draft resolution submitted by a Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2) presented a rather pessimistic analysis of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The reality, as eloquently demonstrated by some earlier speakers, as well as in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1, submitted by Australia and others, was more positive, and his delegation would wish to see that reality reflected in the final document. Accordingly, he suggested that language in the final document on peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be based on five elements.

First, the importance of article IV, which was and remained one of the cornerstone articles of the Treaty, should be stressed. Second, a few paragraphs should be devoted to international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, which had considerably increased since 1985. The work done within the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency should be mentioned prominently in that connection. Third, the record of the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation activities over the past five years was a good one and should be stressed. Fourth, mention should be made of bilateral co-operation among States Parties in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an aspect which unfortunately was often neglected. His country, for

its part, had, over the years, accepted many trainees from all parts of the world under IAEA fellowships and still continued to do so; regrettably, not all the opportunities offered by Belgium were taken up. Belgium's nuclear industry had a fine record of excellence and continued to be active internationally, especially in the field of safety of nuclear installations. Fifth, some reference should be made to prospects for the future. In his delegation's view, the trend towards increased bilateral and multilateral co-operation should continue under effective safeguards and with due regard for the demands of nuclear safety and radiological protection.

Ms. FATIMAH (Malaysia), having stressed the important role played by the NPT in focusing international efforts on the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, said that the observance by States Parties of article IV could not be regarded as satisfactory. Without serious and concerted efforts to correct that situation, universal adherence to the Treaty could not be expected in the near future. Her delegation fully supported the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1) expressing the concern of States Parties with regard to the implementation of article IV and suggesting specific steps to be taken in that connection.

The nuclear power option, attractive as it was to developing countries striving for industrialization while at the same time seeking to reduce adverse environmental impact from burning fossil fuels, remained unattainable for many of those countries, owing, *inter alia*, to the prohibitive cost associated with a nuclear power programme. The Senior Experts Group established by the IAEA in 1986 to study arrangements for the financing of such programmes in developing countries had not yet produced results. In the meantime, a number of obstacles still remained to the developing countries' quest for an environmentally cleaner and more reliable source of energy. More particularly, export credit conditions were still unattractive as far as nuclear power was concerned. Her delegation hoped that the final document of the Conference would accurately reflect that situation. The suspension in 1987 of formal discussions within the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply and the failure of the UNCPICPUNE Conference to reach consensus represented further setbacks to the developing countries wishing to develop a nuclear programme. Her delegation was nevertheless hopeful that, with the help of the IAEA, those obstacles would eventually be overcome. Hence it called upon States Parties to show greater sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their obligations under article IV.

The expansion of applications of nuclear techniques in the field of medicine, agriculture and industry during the period under review was encouraging. However, the zero real growth of the IAEA's regular budget imposed constraints on promoting nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Her delegation wished to see not only a greater expansion of the IAEA's promotional activities but also wider participation by scientists from developing countries in co-ordinated research programmes and in the IAEA's technical and expert meetings. The zero real growth policy had surely outlived its purpose, and it was time to allow some meaningful growth in the Agency's regular budget.

While the commendable results achieved by the IAEA in the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries could be attributed to the dedication of the IAEA secretariat, to the commitment of recipient States and to the generosity of donor States, an assured financial resource was essential to ensure a successful and sustainable technical co-operation programme. Although it might on the surface be true that, as other representatives had alleged, there had been some growth in technical co-operation funds, actual payments to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, which constituted the main source of technical co-operation funding, had in reality continued to decline. Her delegation was concerned that, unless appropriate steps were taken, the much-needed programmes in developing countries would be seriously hampered.

Technical co-operation through regional mechanisms had proved highly effective. In the Asia and Pacific region, the Regional Co-operative Agreement had been of enormous help to Member States in achieving self-reliance in the applications of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Malaysia attached great importance to such regional arrangements and, in that regard, wished to congratulate the African States on the recently concluded African Regional Co-operative Agreement.

In conclusion, she wished to stress that the objectives of the NPT could be achieved only through effective and equitable implementation of all its provisions, including article IV. As a multilateral institution with a central role in the implementation of article IV, the IAEA should continue to receive the full support of all States Parties. Her delegation hoped to see a meaningful growth in the Agency's programmes in the near future.

Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) recalled that the IAEA's two main interrelated objectives were, first, to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and, second, to ensure that assistance provided by it, or at its request

or under its supervision or control, was not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. In his delegation's view, both those objectives should be considered on an equal footing; in other words, the full commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and their acceptance of IAEA safeguards should be based on the assumption that they would fully benefit, on a non-discriminatory basis, from technical assistance and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Unfortunately, the Agency's technical co-operation programme was funded by the unassured and unpredictable mechanism of voluntary contributions, whereas the safeguards system was financed out of the regular budget. Reiterated appeals over the past two decades by almost all developing States members of the IAEA, most of which were Parties to the NPT, calling for the correction of that anomaly had thus far been ignored by the major donors, which were also mostly Parties to the Treaty.

With reference to the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), he noted that, in view of the absence of co-operation by some industrialized countries, and in particular by the nuclear-weapon States Parties, CAS had so far been unable to complete its task. In the meantime, new restrictions relating to nuclear technology transfer had been and would continue to be imposed on the developing countries. A similar negative attitude had been observed at the UNCPICPUNE Conference.

His delegation fully endorsed the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1). While commending the contribution made by the IAEA within the limits of the unassured financial resources available in the area of technical co-operation, it expected States Parties to conduct a fair and unbiased critical review of the implementation of the Treaty and of the Agency's statutory obligations. In conclusion, he requested that the points he had made should be duly reflected in the final document of Main Committee III.

Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) introduced the working paper submitted by his delegation and 10 others, containing proposed language for the final document in connection with article V (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.4).

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

PROVISIONAL

For participants only

✓NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.3
4 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 29 August 1990, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (continued)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (continued)

The CHAIRMAN said that, in informal consultations with delegations, general agreement had emerged on following the same format as the final document produced by Main Committee III at the Third Review Conference. Working papers were ready on seven of the eight categories of issues identified as relating to article IV, and the paper on the eighth category was expected shortly. The Bureau had also prepared an informal paper, which it hoped was as neutral as possible, concerning article V. The working paper submitted by Australia on behalf of 10 States appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1; the working paper prepared by Italy appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.2; two working papers prepared by Bangladesh appeared in NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.3 and Add.1; a second working paper submitted by Australia on behalf of 11 States appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.4; the working paper prepared by the United States would appear shortly in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.5; the working paper presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1; and the working paper presented by Egypt appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/31.

Every effort must be made to adopt the Committee's report by consensus, in accordance with rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. In view of time constraints, he suggested that the drafting exercise should be conducted by the Drafting Group at an informal meeting; the results would then have to be endorsed by the Committee at a formal meeting.

If he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt his suggestion.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.

PROVISIONAL

For participants only

✓NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.4
5 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 31 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (continued)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (continued)

The CHAIRMAN said that the Drafting Group had made good progress in preparing the final report and it was hoped that it would be possible to conclude the first reading at the Group's next meeting. He suggested that another two meetings of the Drafting Group should be held to conclude the second reading, and copies of the report would be made available so that the Committee could adopt it at meetings on 3 and 4 September.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 3.30 p.m. to enable the Drafting Group to meet.

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/L.1 and Add.1 and 2)

The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the draft report, which was the outcome of discussions held in the open-ended drafting group, where good progress had been made and agreement reached on many important matters. The President of the Conference had expressed satisfaction at the progress made by Main Committee III and the hope that the latter would be able to approve its draft report at the current meeting.

After drawing attention to a number of editorial additions and amendments; and in the absence of any observations on the part of members of the Committee, he said he would take it that the Committee accepted the technical part of the draft report, as contained in paragraphs 1-6. He then invited the Committee to consider the section of the draft report relating to formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference.

Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation's approval of the draft report must remain tentative until the Committee members' views had been made clear on all substantive items.

Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation appreciated the Chairman's efforts towards achieving consensus adoption of the Committee's draft report. The developing countries party to the NPT had worked in a spirit of unstinting co-operation and consensus on all subjects, including the question of South Africa and Israel. But a lack of co-operation on the part of a few delegations, including those of certain nuclear Powers, had made it impossible to settle all outstanding questions. His delegation appealed for one more informal effort, with a view to the adoption in plenary meeting of the Final Declaration in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN said he felt sure that all members of the Committee had striven to reach a consensus. He invited the Committee to consider the draft formulations item by item. In that connection, a text had just been circulated to the members of the Committee in respect of item IX; that item, therefore, would be considered last of all.

I. Inalienable rights and fullest possible exchange

II. Supply assurances/non-proliferation assurances

The CHAIRMAN noted that the Committee had no comments relating to the texts of items I and II.

III. Promotion and financing of nuclear power

Ms. MAEGAARD-NIELSEN (Denmark), referring to paragraph 2, said that, since many environmental problems associated with the use of nuclear power remained unsolved, her delegation was in no position to accept wording which implied the use of nuclear power. It would prefer the words "the area of promotion and financing of nuclear power" to be replaced by "the field of nuclear energy"; it also felt that, in the second and sixth lines in the English text of paragraph 3, the word "power" should be replaced by "energy".

Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) strongly urged that the text of paragraph 2 should be left as it stood; he saw no difficulty with the wording, since the call for full co-operation was addressed to all States parties "in a position to do so". The text of paragraph 3 was a statement of fact; it was incontrovertible that IAEA did provide assistance in the development of nuclear power.

Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation, though it too saw some difficulty with the text of paragraph 2, could accept it, especially if the Committee could agree to add the words "if requested". The text of paragraph 3 seemed more satisfactory, since the words "upon request" were contained in the second sentence; it might be an improvement to add, in the first sentence, the word "interested" before "developing States".

The CHAIRMAN said he felt that the United States representative's observations fully reflected the drafting group's approach, and that adoption of the Danish delegation's proposal might alter the text's main thrust. He suggested, therefore, that the text could be left as it stood, the relevant observations being noted in the summary record of the meeting.

Mr. ALER (Sweden) said he appreciated the point made by the delegation of Denmark; his own delegation, too, found some difficulty with that and other parts of the text. However, mindful of the intense efforts which had gone into the drafting, he was prepared to follow the Chairman's suggestion.

Ms. MAEGAARD-NIELSEN (Denmark) said that it was not her delegation's intention to block the consensus on the Committee's report.

The CHAIRMAN said that, on that understanding, he took it that the Committee had no objection to the text as it stood.

- IV. Nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management
- V. Technical assistance
- VI. United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
- VII. Sustainable development and environmental perspective
- VIII. Attacks on nuclear facilities

The CHAIRMAN said he noted that the Committee had no comments in relation to items IV-VIII.

X. Review of article V

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said that the Final Declaration should be comprehensive in scope and apply to all possible cases. Therefore, his delegation proposed the addition of a third paragraph to item X, reading:

"The Conference also notes the potential nuclear-weapon capability of a State party to the Treaty, where the nuclear facility is not safeguarded".

Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) said that his delegation, and doubtless some others, shared the concern which underlay the previous speaker's proposal. On the other hand, he doubted whether the text of the item in question was the best place in which to express it. In any case, it seemed that the matter was being considered in one of the other Main Committees. Again, the text as it stood was the outcome of thorough consideration aimed at achieving a careful balance, which any further amendment might upset. He hoped that the delegation of the Republic of Korea would not insist on amending the text and that the point raised could be duly reflected in the summary record.

The CHAIRMAN said that in view of the fact that item X dealt with a review of article V of the Treaty, the point raised by the Republic of Korea was not relevant to that item.

Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that he agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom. While the point made by the Republic of Korea was valid, it did not belong under item X. Perhaps the proposal could be taken up when the Committee considered item IX, where it might be more relevant. In any event, the issue was not the potential nuclear-weapon capability of a State party to the Treaty, but rather whether that State party represented a threat to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Mrs. BATACLAN (Philippines) said that her delegation wished to associate itself with the statement by the representative of Canada.

The CHAIRMAN said if he heard no further comments, he would take it that the Committee had no objections to item X as it stood.

XI. Review of article IX

Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that, with respect to paragraph 3 of item XI, informal dialogue between the States party to the Treaty and States not party to the Treaty had been going on for many years and would surely continue in the future. Consequently, he wondered whether the word "initiation" in the first line was appropriate.

Mr. SAHBOUN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that while the efforts of the Chairman and other delegations to reach consensus were greatly appreciated, some points of disagreement remained. Therefore, the acceptance by his delegation of the sections under consideration was only provisional, pending approval of the entire text.

The CHAIRMAN said that in the absence of further comments, he would take it that the Committee had no objection to item XI.

Item IX

At the invitation of the CHAIRMAN, Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria) read out the following proposed text for item IX:

"The Conference notes that the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the NPT, in particular South Africa and Israel, represent a threat to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under article IV. The Conference affirms its desire to see such nuclear programmes directed to peaceful purposes in conformity with article IV by the adherence of these States to the NPT and their acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Conference notes the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel."

He pointed out that, within the working group which had elaborated the text, the following questions had been considered: whether Main Committee III was the appropriate forum in which to consider that particular issue, and whether specific countries should be mentioned in the text. There had been general agreement that attention should be focused on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would avoid an overlap with the work of the other Main Committees in the same area. The working group believed that the text had given due consideration to all the views expressed, and recommended it for acceptance by the Committee.

Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) said that, having participated in the informal consultations on the text, his delegation appreciated the spirit of co-operation that had been demonstrated. However, while it represented substantial progress towards language which would be acceptable to all, the text as it stood did not meet all the concerns of his delegation. The question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy certainly belonged in the final report of the Committee. However, the paragraph under consideration singled out only two of the threshold States which gave cause for concern. His delegation was equally concerned about the activities of States which had not been mentioned. Perhaps the text should be forwarded for review to the Drafting Committee, which could then ensure that the language was consistent with the corresponding texts submitted by the other Committees.

Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) endorsed the statement by the representative of the United States of America. His delegation was also concerned about the lack of balance in the text. It would not be opposed to forwarding the text, as it stood, to the Drafting Committee.

Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that unless agreement could be reached on every section, the report should not go to the Drafting Committee as representing the Committee's final report.

It was quite logical to single out South Africa and Israel, since only those two States had ignored the many international resolutions and declarations calling for co-operation with IAEA vis-à-vis nuclear safeguards. The fact that South Africa and Israel were mentioned specifically would put pressure on them to comply with those safeguards. If there were other States not party to the Treaty which had demonstrated a similar lack of commitment to those regulations, his delegation would be glad to name them specifically. Finally, he urged all delegations not to block consensus on the text under consideration.

Mrs. EL TALLAWI (Egypt) pointed out that Israel and South Africa had already been singled out on many occasions, in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the IAEA General Conference. Like many others, her delegation was concerned about the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the NPT. For that reason, it had agreed, in a spirit of compromise, to the wording "in particular South Africa and Israel", implying that there were in fact other

States involved. Her delegation could not accept a less strong wording. If other States were singled out elsewhere, her delegation would be willing to mention them. She hoped that the delegations who were opposed to the text under consideration would join the consensus.

Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the text which had been considered by the Committee on the previous day was the same as that adopted by consensus at the Third Review Conference in 1985. It was regrettable that the United States, which had joined the consensus on that decision, now wished to change the text. His delegation was satisfied with the text as adopted in 1985. Neither Israel nor South Africa had ever taken any effective steps towards accepting the NPT or complying with agreements on global safeguards and guarantees. Had they done so, his delegation would not insist on maintaining the 1985 version of the text. Moreover, after 1985, new factors had come to light which made that version even more compelling. A reputable British newspaper had published a statement by an Israeli nuclear technician to the effect that Israel had a nuclear arsenal of more than 100 bombs. The accuracy of that statement had been confirmed by a celebrated British nuclear scientist. Israel's nuclear capability was well known. In addition, it had an arsenal of intercontinental missiles. Consequently, it represented a threat to all the Arab countries and possibly even to many Asian and European countries.

In singling out Israel and South Africa, the text was consistent with many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and IAEA. The reasons were known to all: those two countries were racist and expansionist and had no trust in the United Nations, and posed a threat to world peace and security. In contrast, there were no resolutions which referred to the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of India or Pakistan. If the United States was concerned about such a danger, it should submit a draft resolution to that effect to the General Assembly, the Security Council or the IAEA General Conference.

His country, which had hoped to adopt a text similar to that adopted in 1985, was willing to accept the text under consideration. If the United States insisted on blocking the consensus, his delegation would interpret that action as a deliberate attempt to deadlock the Committee, undermining the spirit of compromise which had prevailed up to that point.

Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) said that the Committee's draft report represented a substantial achievement and reflected favourably on the serious commitment of the Committee members. With respect to the text currently under consideration, he pointed out that the situation had changed considerably since 1985 and, consequently, a new text was in order. Not only had the threat of nuclear proliferation changed in character, but the attitudes of States party to the Treaty had changed with respect to various questions concerning the supply of nuclear technology and equipment. Singling out two States was discriminatory since the problem of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities existed in a number of threshold States. As a possible solution, he suggested that the words "in particular" in the first sentence should be replaced by the word "including". His delegation agreed that the text as it stood might be forwarded to the Drafting Committee with the remainder of the report.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) urged delegations to bear in mind that the issue under consideration was a highly sensitive one for the majority of the parties to the Treaty, and would have an impact on the future work of the Fourth Review Conference and that of other forums as well. He pointed out that the nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel had been mentioned specifically several times in the Final Declaration of 1985. Indeed, all the previous Final Declarations had singled out those two countries, as had several General Assembly resolutions. Those actions had been taken in response to concern expressed by the countries in regions bordering South Africa and Israel.

His delegation hoped that a consensus text could be arrived at, failing which it would associate itself with the view of the non-aligned parties to the Treaty.

Mr. VERBEEK (Netherlands) said that he was in favour of sending the text being discussed to the Drafting Committee for consideration in the light of the problems found by the other Main Committees. His delegation was not entirely satisfied, however, with the wording of the text, which was insufficiently balanced. While it was true that Israel and South Africa had been singled out in United Nations resolutions and those of other organizations, some of those resolutions had also been insufficiently balanced. To improve the text, his delegation proposed that the word "weapons" should be inserted in the last sentence so that it would read "... any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear weapons programme of South Africa and Israel".

Mr. HILALE (Morocco) said that he was surprised that a consensus had not so far been reached with regard to the nuclear programmes of States which were not parties. While specific mention had been made of South Africa and Israel in United Nations resolutions and those of other major international organizations, there had been no such mention of other non-parties, although individual countries might well have produced reports or resolutions of their own reflecting their concerns regarding other non-parties for quite legitimate reasons. He said that no one denied the threat that the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Israel posed to their neighbours. For 20 years, all African countries, with the exception of South Africa, had been calling for their continent to be denuclearized. The Middle East continued to be a highly volatile area because of Israel's refusal to adhere to repeated calls by the United Nations for the area to be denuclearized. It was clear therefore that the item under consideration merely reiterated concerns which had been expressed in the reports of the previous three Review Conferences and which were now even greater owing to the increased evidence regarding the nuclear programmes of those two States.

In the current international climate, attempts were being made to raise the credibility of the United Nations and to ensure the universal implementation of the Organization's resolutions. His delegation hoped that IAEA could contribute to that objective by referring to United Nations resolutions and, in particular, those which stated that the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Israel posed a threat not only to their respective regions, but also to the non-proliferation régime itself.

Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria) thanked the delegations of Australia and the Netherlands for their constructive proposals. The fact that something had been said in the 1985 report was, he agreed, insufficient grounds for repeating it in the 1990 report. It was for that reason that the original text had been significantly modified. His delegation, like others, believed that since the United Nations and IAEA had specifically referred only to South Africa and Israel in the past, there were grounds for mentioning only those two States. He urged those delegations which opposed the naming of the two States to take into account the fact that the text under consideration was not as strongly worded as that of the 1985 report.

Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said he had hoped for a consensus on the issue, but realized that a sensitive area was involved. Considerable progress had however been made in the morning's informal discussions on the text, which situated the problem in the context of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under article IV and urged non-parties to rectify the situation. While his delegation would have preferred not to name countries specifically - since South Africa and Israel were not alone in that category of States - it was prepared to accept that they should be named in the interests of compromise, bearing in mind that the original text had been toned down and that a similar text had been approved in the 1985 report. He added that his delegation could support the Australian proposal that "in particular" should be replaced by "including", if that produced a broader consensus.

Mr. ANGULIANO (Mexico) thanked delegations for their efforts to reach consensus on an important and complex issue. Since all delegations would have another opportunity to discuss the Committee's report after it had been integrated in the Final Declaration by the Drafting Committee, he proposed that the report should be sent to the Drafting Committee with an indication as to which parts of the report had been agreed on in principle.

Mr. NEFEDOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thanked delegates for their efforts to reach a compromise solution. He said that the text under consideration reflected the viewpoints of all the countries involved in the informal discussions. While many of the members of the Committee agreed that the wording was not perfect, it was nevertheless a more or less balanced text, and his delegation was therefore in favour of accepting it and submitting it with the remainder of the report to the Drafting Committee, with a minor grammatical change to the last line to read "the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Israel".

Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation could not accept the proposed replacement of "in particular" with "including", nor the Netherlands proposal that the text should refer to "nuclear weapons programmes". The former was unacceptable as it would put countries involved in only minor nuclear activities on an equal footing with those conducting large-scale nuclear activities. The latter was unacceptable as previous IAEA resolutions had not referred to nuclear weapons programmes; moreover, it was well known to be very difficult to separate general nuclear programmes from nuclear weapons programmes.

The CHAIRMAN observed that, while much progress had been made on the issue during informal contacts, agreement had not yet been reached on the final language to be used. He pointed out to the members of the Committee that they would have another chance to discuss all the problems when the full report was considered by the Conference plenary. It was his hope that, as in the case of the 1985 Review Conference, a consensus could be reached on the issue in the Final Declaration. He urged members of the Committee to continue their efforts to reach a consensus, but proposed that the practice used in 1985 could be followed by placing before the disputed paragraph the words: "The Committee was unable to reach a consensus on the following paragraph:". That would be followed by the original text proposed by Nigeria, since the text was still the subject of negotiations.

Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that since the delegations blocking the consensus against the will of the majority had done so on the grounds that the situation had changed since 1985, the Chairman's suggestion of using the same procedure as in 1985 was not necessarily advisable. His delegation could not accept the submission of the report to the Drafting Committee if the problems surrounding item IX were ignored. As a compromise solution, he suggested that the Committee should adjourn for informal consultations and resume that afternoon. His delegation, like others, would not be satisfied if only part of the Committee's mandate was reflected in the report. The alternative was that a compilation of the standpoints of all delegations regarding the report in its entirety should be submitted to the Drafting Committee.

Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria) supported the proposal that the meeting should be adjourned for informal consultations.

The CHAIRMAN said that that would unfortunately be impossible since conference facilities would not be available. He believed, like most delegations, that talks could continue informally on the issue, but they could take place after the Committee had concluded its final meeting, since there would be enough time before the Conference reviewed the final document. He suggested that paragraph 7 of the introductory part of the report should be reworded to read: "The Committee considered at its fifth meeting the following formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference. However, due to disagreement on item IX, the Committee was unable to adopt it as a whole."

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 1.25 p.m.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said that an understanding had been reached among delegations of the non-aligned group, who wished to propose the following new wording for paragraph 7:

"The Committee considered at its fifth meeting the following formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference. However, due to disagreement on item IX, the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on the report as a whole."

In reply to a question from the CHAIRMAN, Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) agreed that that wording could be interpreted as meaning that the Committee had failed to reach consensus on the technical part as well as on the substantive part of the report. His proposed solution would mean that the debate could be reopened by any delegation when the draft report reached the next stage of consideration. He believed that that practice had already been established in Conference negotiations. However, given that part of the report had already been fully discussed, he did not think that it would be difficult to adopt the report. The text to be used for item IX should be the original text proposed by the delegation of Nigeria, as amended by the representative of Egypt, with specific mention made of South Africa and Israel, reading as follows:

"The Conference expresses great and serious concern about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and that the development of such a capability by South Africa and Israel would undermine the credibility and stability of the non-proliferation Treaty régime.

"The Conference notes the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further notes the demands made on South Africa and Israel to accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to pledge themselves not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices."

The CHAIRMAN said that, since the use of the words "report as a whole" proposed by the representative of Indonesia implied that paragraph 7 itself had not been agreed upon, the proposed amendment should read "... was unable to adopt the substantive part of the report as a whole".

Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) proposed that, in order to clarify the situation, the word "following" should be inserted, so that the final part of the sentence would read "adopt the following substantive part of the report as a whole".

Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that, although in the interests of consensus the proposed solution might have to be sufficient, he wished to point out that much progress had been made in the informal discussions regarding item IX and that no delegation had said that it wished to block the language of the revised version, although some had reservations in that regard. It would therefore be regrettable to return to the language of the original text produced by the delegation of Nigeria. His delegation therefore favoured the use of the text read out by the representative of Nigeria at the current meeting.

The CHAIRMAN said that the view of the Canadian delegate would be recorded, but he did not think that that proposal would produce a consensus. However, he urged delegations to continue to work towards a consensus on item IX. The Committee's consideration of the report was therefore concluded. After an exchange of courtesies, the CHAIRMAN declared that the Committee had completed its work.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.